Als Sprecher dachte ich an die Synchronstimme von John Cusack oder Edward Norton.
Cold War Reloaded - Der neue Ost-West Konflikt
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Wo genau soll diese Barrikade stehen, von der wir hier sprechen? "Im Krieg"?
Na im Kopf. … is son fight club ding.
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Schon ein paar Tage zurück, das letzte Update vom Ukraine Support Tracker-Projekt:
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics…/ukraine-support-tracker/
ZitatAlles anzeigenUpdate July 6, 2023: Data since Jan. 24, 2022, and through May 31, 2023
Despite some larger support packages, the total amount of new bilateral support commitments to Ukraine by other countries has been low in spring 2023 compared to previous periods. In the newly covered period, February 25 to May 31, the value of all recorded commitments to Ukraine increased by a good €13 billion to a total of about €165 billion; almost €9 billion were for military aid. Germany, now the second biggest contributor of military aid in absolute terms, increased its military pledges by €3.26 billion, or 76 percent, to €7.5 billion total.
The EU increased the European Peace Facility with two additional tranches worth €1 billion each to a total of €5.6 billion. For the entire year, Denmark promises military support worth €1 billion, including additional Leopard-2 tanks. Poland pledged two new additional military aid packages worth a total of €581 million.
A new analysis of relative aid composition over time underpins the trend towards military aid. While in the first 10 months of the war military and financial aid have been fairly balanced, since October 2022 the share of military aid among the fresh bilateral commitments has steadily increased. In the beginning of 2023, over half of the newly pledged aid was of military nature. In April and May of 2023, this even increased to over 70 percent.
Iceland is now added to the Tracker to further complete the list of donor countries.
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Als Sprecher dachte ich an die Synchronstimme von John Cusack oder Edward Norton.
Ich hatte da eher so TKKG Vibes. Mit einer Prise Jan Tenner meets Larry Brent.
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Der Artiel in der NYT ist leider gepaywalled. Kann den jemand lesen?
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Alles anzeigenNATO Isn’t What It Says It Is
July 11, 2023
By Grey Anderson and Thomas Meaney
NATO leaders convening this week in Vilnius, Lithuania, have every reason to toast their success.
Only four years ago, on the eve of another summit, the organization looked to be in low water; in the words of President Emmanuel Macron of France, it was undergoing nothing short of “brain death.” Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the situation has been transformed. As NATO plans to welcome Sweden into its ranks — Finland became a full-fledged member in April — and dispatch troops to reinforce its eastern flank, European Union allies are finally making good on long-deferred promises to increase military spending. Public opinion has followed suit. If Russia sought to divide Europe, President Biden could plausibly declare last spring that it had instead fully “NATO-ized” the continent.
This turnabout has understandably energized the alliance’s supporters. The statement of purpose from Jens Stoltenberg, its secretary general, that “the strength of NATO is the best possible tool we have to maintain peace and security” has never had more loyal adherents. Even critics of the organization — such as China hawks who see it as a distraction from the real threat in East Asia and restrainers who would prefer that Washington refocus on diplomatic solutions and problems at home — concede that NATO’s purpose is primarily the defense of Europe.
But NATO, from its origins, was never primarily concerned with aggregating military power. Fielding 100 divisions at its Cold War height, a small fraction of Warsaw Pact manpower, the organization could not be counted on to repel a Soviet invasion and even the continent’s nuclear weapons were under Washington’s control. Rather, it set out to bind Western Europe to a far vaster project of a U.S.-led world order, in which American protection served as a lever to obtain concessions on other issues, like trade and monetary policy. In that mission, it has proved remarkably successful.
Many observers expected NATO to close shop after the collapse of its Cold War rival. But in the decade after 1989, the organization truly came into its own. NATO acted as a ratings agency for the European Union in Eastern Europe, declaring countries secure for development and investment. The organization pushed would-be partners to adhere to a liberal, pro-market creed, according to which — as President Bill Clinton’s national security adviser put it — “the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets” and “the promotion of collective security” marched in lock step. European military professionals and reform-minded elites formed a willing constituency, their campaigns boosted by NATO’s information apparatus.
When European populations proved too stubborn, or undesirably swayed by socialist or nationalist sentiments, Atlantic integration proceeded all the same. The Czech Republic was a telling case. Faced with a likely “no” vote in a referendum on joining the alliance in 1997, the secretary general and top NATO officials saw to it that the government in Prague simply dispense with the exercise; the country joined two years later. The new century brought more of the same, with an appropriate shift in emphasis. Coinciding with the global war on terrorism, the “big bang” expansion of 2004 — in which seven countries acceded — saw counterterrorism supersede democracy and human rights in alliance rhetoric. Stress on the need for liberalization and public sector reforms remained a constant.
In the realm of defense, the alliance was not as advertised. For decades, the United States has been the chief provider of weapons, logistics, air bases and battle plans. The war in Ukraine, for all the talk of Europe stepping up, has left that asymmetry essentially untouched. Tellingly, the scale of U.S. military aid — $47 billion over the first year of the conflict — is more than double that offered by European Union countries combined. European spending pledges may also turn out to be less impressive than they appear. More than a year after the German government publicized the creation of a special $110 billion fund for its armed forces, the bulk of the credits remain unused. In the meantime, German military commanders have said that they lack sufficient munitions for more than two days of high-intensity combat.
Whatever the levels of expenditure, it is remarkable how little military capability Europeans get for the outlays involved. Lack of coordination, as much as penny-pinching, hamstrings Europe’s ability to ensure its own security. By forbidding duplication of existing capabilities and prodding allies to accept niche roles, NATO has stymied the emergence of any semiautonomous European force capable of independent action. As for defense procurement, common standards for interoperability, coupled with the sheer size of the U.S. military-industrial sector and bureaucratic impediments in Brussels, favor American firms at the expense of their European competitors. The alliance, paradoxically, appears to have weakened allies’ ability to defend themselves.
Yet the paradox is only superficial. In fact, NATO is working exactly as it was designed by postwar U.S. planners, drawing Europe into a dependency on American power that reduces its room for maneuver. Far from a costly charity program, NATO secures American influence in Europe on the cheap. U.S. contributions to NATO and other security assistance programs in Europe account for a tiny fraction of the Pentagon’s annual budget — less than 6 percent by a recent estimate. And the war has only strengthened America’s hand. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, roughly half of European military spending went to American manufacturers. Surging demand has exacerbated this tendency as buyers rush to acquire tanks, combat aircraft and other weapons systems, locking into costly, multiyear contracts. Europe may be remilitarizing, but America is reaping the rewards.
In Ukraine, the pattern is clear. Washington will provide the military security, and its corporations will benefit from a bonanza of European armament orders, while Europeans will shoulder the cost of postwar reconstruction — something Germany is better poised to accomplish than the buildup of its military. The war also serves as a dress rehearsal for U.S. confrontation with China, in which European support cannot be so easily counted on. Limiting Beijing’s access to strategic technologies and promoting American industry are hardly European priorities, and severing European and Chinese trade is still difficult to imagine. Yet already there are signs that NATO is making headway in getting Europe to follow its lead in the theater. On the eve of a visit to Washington at the end of June, Germany’s defense minister duly advertised his awareness of “European responsibility for the Indo-Pacific” and the importance of “the rules-based international order” in the South China Sea.
No matter their ascendance, Atlanticists fret over support for the organization being undermined by disinformation and cybermeddling. They needn’t worry. Contested throughout the Cold War, NATO remained a subject of controversy into the 1990s, when the disappearance of its adversary encouraged thoughts of a new European security architecture. Today, dissent is less audible than ever before.
Left parties in Europe, historically critical of militarism and American power, have overwhelmingly enlisted in the defense of the West: The trajectory of the German Greens, from fierce opponents of nuclear weapons to a party seemingly willing to risk atomic war, is a particularly vivid illustration. Stateside, criticism of NATO focuses on the risks of overextending U.S. treaty obligations, not their underlying justification. The most successful alliance in history, gathering in celebration of itself, need not wait for its 75th anniversary next year to uncork the champagne.
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Alles anzeigen
Hat die Ukraine geplant ein Binnenland zu werden?
Odessa könnte eine echte Offensive erleben, so wie sich die (inoffiziellen) Zahlen lesen.
Hat Russland geplant ein Binnenland zu werden?
Die Krim könnte eine echte Offensive erleben, so wie sich die (inoffiziellen) Zahlen lesen.
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Hat Russland geplant ein Binnenland zu werden?
Das wäre nen sehr weiter Weg zum Binnenland...
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Das wäre nen sehr weiter Weg zum Binnenland...
Nach den Traumvorstellungen des Werte-Westen(tm) ist der Osten eh bald chinesisch und der Rest streitet sich darüber, wer der coolere Militär-Diktator ist.
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Nach den Traumvorstellungen des Werte-Westen(tm) ist der Osten eh bald chinesisch und der Rest streitet sich darüber, wer der coolere Militär-Diktator ist.
Nach den Traumvorstellungen des Werte-Westens hätte UA zur Frühjahrsoffensive auf NatoHardware reitend eine Bresche durch unfähige "Orks" bis zum Asowschen Meer schlagen sollen. Anstelle dessen hat man sich von ... Minen überraschen lassen.
Ggf kleinere Brötchen?
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Wer weiß was am Ende bei den Russen los sein wird, vor allem da der Krieg leider noch lange anhalten wird.
Die Auflösungserscheinungen sind zumindest bereits sichtbar.
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It’s the beginning of the end of mr p.
The walls are closing in!
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Ja gut, man kann’s natürlich auch als absolut belanglos ansehen wenn ein Söldner-Chef aus Frust erst ein Militär-Lager einnimmt, von Putin als Verräter benannt wird, seine Truppe auf dem Weg nach Moskau dann ein Flugzeug und Helikopter der Armee abschließt, dann aber ungestraft ins vermeintliche Exil geht, ein paar Tage später aber wieder in Russland frei rumläuft.
Oder ein anderer General der sich für seine Soldaten einsetzen will, dafür aber kurzerhand entlassen wird, sich dann bitterlich über die Führung beschwert und von absichtlicher Inkompetenz fabuliert.
Alles normal und vollkommen unfaul im Staate Russland…
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Solange man bei der Obsession für Putin und das Warten auf den Zusammenbruch der Russischen Föderation nicht die Entwicklung daheim übersieht, ist alles im Lot. Man sollte auch im Blick haben, dass bei der Berichtestattung immer ein gutes Stück Fan Fiction mit dabei ist. T-Online ist für Zurückhaltung jetzt auch nicht so berühmt.
Der Chef der Komponisten-Söldner hat dem russischen Dirigenten seiner Oligarchie allerdings eine ähnlich günstige Gelegenheit geschaffen, Wackelkandidaten auszumachen, wie damals die Militärs dem Sultan in der Türkei. Dementsprechend war auch zu erwarten, dass anschließend ein paar Umbesetzungen folgen werden. Erstaunlich wenig Fensterstürze bisher.
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Der "liberale" Herr Nawalny wird's ziemlich sicher nicht werden.
Dieser Plot-Twist würde mich allerdings nicht mehr überraschen.
Diese Zeitlinie ist verrückt genug das er sich aus dem Gulag heraus zum nächsten Zaren aufschwingt.
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Welche Auflösungserscheinungen?
Bei der Sache mit dem Wagner-Putsch bin ich mir mangels Details nicht sicher was da dran war, eins ist jedenfalls sicher, bei solchen erfolglosen Coups wird in der Regel gründlich aufgeräumt (siehe Erdogan).
Bei den Wahlen stellt Putin sicher noch lange alle westlichen Regierungen in den Schatten was die prozentualen Mehrheiten angeht.
Wirtschaftlich? Naja, geht kaum schlimmer wie bei uns.
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Alles anzeigen
Welche Auflösungserscheinungen?
Bei der Sache mit dem Wagner-Putsch bin ich mir mangels Details nicht sicher was da dran war, eins ist jedenfalls sicher, bei solchen erfolglosen Coups wird in der Regel gründlich aufgeräumt (siehe Erdogan).
Bei den Wahlen stellt Putin sicher noch lange alle westlichen Regierungen in den Schatten was die prozentualen Mehrheiten angeht.
Wirtschaftlich? Naja, geht kaum schlimmer wie bei uns.
Ach, das gute alte Copium…
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Was ist denn so bemerkenswert an dem T-Online-Artikel?
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